Intelligent Software Agents and Agency Law by Smed, Suzanne
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 14 | Issue 2 Article 8
January 1998
Intelligent Software Agents and Agency Law
Suzanne Smed
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Suzanne Smed, Intelligent Software Agents and Agency Law, 14 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 503 (1998).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol14/iss2/8
INTELLIGENT SOFTWARE AGENTS AND
AGENCY LAW*
Suzanne Smedt
I. INTRODUCTION
Soon we will be living in an information economy, a world
dominated by an abundance of bits. This future will be based on
keeping in touch, thus creating an economy of relationships; it will
no longer be an economy of products.
Even today, access to information is easy. However, fmding
what is useful is still difficult. "Software agents," currently com-
mercially available, can assist. Agents are rules-based software
products which may aid with Internet searches, filter incoming elec-
tronic mail, find the appropriate area of a help program in on-line
documentation, watch for news on topics you have specified, and
suggest changes to your stock portfolio.
Advances in the area of artificial intelligence are producing
"learning algorithms" that will soon produce software agent products
that are based on neural networks. These products, the "second gen-
eration of intelligent software agents," will be able to learn from
their experiences and adapt their behavior accordingly. Software
programs with this ability to learn will, consequently, be capable of
decision-making, resulting in software that may take actions that
neither the licensor nor licensee anticipated.
The hope is that these intelligent software agents will provide
commercial value by completing personal and commercial transac-
tions. Clearly, responsibility will flow from the contractual commit-
ments and harms resulting from such use of the intelligent software
agents.
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But who will be responsible for the commitments and the
harms? Decisions need to be made about what law applies, because,
unlike first generation agents, the next generation of intelligent soft-
ware agents will create situations that are not obvious applications of
legal precedent.
Agency law, however, provides a suitable framework in which
to find the solution. Because an agency relationship is formed when
the software licensee installs and then executes the software program,
intelligent software agents should be regulated under agency law.
IX. WHY REGULATE INTELLIGENT SOFTWARE AGENTS?
One role of law is to structure interactions. Both commercial
and personal interactions are occurring more frequently via comput-
ers and software. Thus the law must address new types of interac-
tions that result from computer use.
Specifically, second generation intelligent software agents will
be capable of causing harm. Unlike first generation software agents,
they will be capable of finding their own sources of information and
making commitments - possible unauthorized commitments. Sup-
pose, for example, an intelligent software agent could conduct your
personal business, such as trading stock and managing your bank ac-
count, initially working within the conservative scope of authority
you granted. Over time it gets smarter, learning from you and other
agents, and you gradually allow it to tolerate more and more risk.
The software agent makes money for you via efficient, effective, high
risk investing. But, one day the Internal Revenue Service remotely
logs on to conduct an audit and, to their surprise as well as yours,
discovers illegal transactions and unreported income for which -
unbeknownst to you, the software user - the intelligent software
agent is completely responsible.
III. WHY LOOK TO AGENCY LAW?
The first generation software agents are usually adequately sup-
ported by the application of contract and tort law. For example,
courts applied traditional tests and reasoning to cases in which per-
sons modified software to bypass data entry edit checks,' or to dis-
tribute obscene materially electronically.2 Contract and tort law are
as applicable to electronic tasks as to mechanical ones, and using the
1. Newbergerv. State of Florida, 641 So. 2d 419 (1994).
2. Sheav. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (1996).
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first generation software agents is just like using any tool with pre-
dictable behavior to accomplish a task.
Contract law, for example, has well established rules related to
offer and acceptance. 3 When the facsimile, a technology with preset
logic,4 emerged as a new tool for message delivery, contract law ex-
panded to incorporate situations involving the use of a fax machine.5
However, application of the law may not be as simple for the
second generation software agents. These agents will have the capa-
bility to learn, adjust, and react without any human intervention
whatsoever.6 Thus, the second generation of software agents will en-
gage, more or less independently, in situations never previously han-
dled by computer software programs. Where software is capable of
unplanned - rather than predictable - behavior, the law will there-
fore need to be applied without factual precedent to these situations.
Rather than anticipating a legal system that attempts, for exam-
ple, to attribute liability to the software program itself, the situations
that will arise from the second generation agents can be resolved by
applying agency law principles. Agency law provides an adequate
framework because, in general, a software licensee will be activating
software for some purpose. The intelligent software agent will then
use its learning, mobility and autonomous properties to accomplish
specific tasks for the licensee. Thus, we see the software agent in the
legal role of the "agent," and the software licensee in the legal role
of the "principal." ' 7 This relationship of agent/principal has been
formed whether or not the parties themselves intended to create an
agency or even think of themselves as agent and principal.8
Once intelligent software agents are viewed as legal agents
within an agency relationship, it follows that liability can be attrib-
uted to the actions of the software agents, binding the software licen-
see (principal) to legal duties.
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrs §§ 24,50 (1981).
4. The steps that the fax machine takes are predefimed and repeated each time it oper-
ates. Thus, the fax machine is a technology based on predictable computer behavior.
5. Group Italglass U.S.A. v. United States, 839 F. Supp. 868 (1993); Gillen v. Atalanta
Sys., 997 F.2d 280 (1993); United States v. Spector, 55 F.3d 22 (1995); Etablissement Asamar
Ltd. v. Lone Eagle Shipping Ltd., 882 F. Supp. 1409 (1995).
6. See MIT Media Lab, Agents Group (visited Nov. 4,1997) <http://agents.www.media
.niit.edu/groups/agents/research.html>.
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 1 (1958).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 1, cmt. b (1958).
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IV. LEGAL AGENT STATUS
At least four theories exist for giving software agents legal
status. Case law has shown courts contemplating the role of a com-
puter in a transaction when attributing liability. Other theories com-
pare software gaining rights and duties to the historical circumstances
of women, slaves, and corporations gaining legal status.
Case examples show the courts using a different standard of re-
sponsibility when the action is done by an unattended machine as op-
posed to the same act done by a human. Case examples exist where
the court decisions attributed liability to the owner for harms caused
by unattended (or autonomous) machines. In one case, the court held
a bank responsible for money allegedly lost during an automatic
teller transaction. 9 The court placed a greater burden on the bank be-
cause the automated teller lacked the ability to corroborate each step
(via recall, recountability, and judgment) as was done with human
teller transactions. In another example, an insurance company was
forced to pay a claim that occurred during a lapsed period of a cus-
tomer's policy. 0 The court held that the computer constituted a
competent agent capable of binding its principal in circumstances
where a similar decision by a human agent might not." And, one
case held that a bank did not comply with the truth in lending regula-
tions because their computer-generated explanation regarding loan
terms, if done without a human to answer questions, was not clear
enough for an ordinary borrower to understand.' 2
Therefore, it appears that the courts are willing to consider ma-
chines as participants in ordinary consumer transactions. By ex-
tending this previous court treatment of transactions conducted by
autonomous machines, or by using the liability theories available un-
der contract (where the actions of an agent bind the principal to third
parties) or tort (where the principal may be vicariously liable for the
actions of the agent), intelligent software agents can be treated as
"legal agents."
Once intelligent software agents are viewed as having legal
status with formation of the agency relationship, it follows that li-
ability can be attributed to the actions of the software agents and the
licensees will consequently be held responsible. Certain legal duties
9. MeEvens v. Citibank, 408 NYS 2d 870 (NY County Civ. Ct. 1978).
10. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Bockhorst, 453 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1972).
11. Id.at535-536.
12. Allen v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 531 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1976).
1NTELLIGENTSO-TWAREAGENTS
vest in the licensees as principals in the newly formed agency rela-
tionship. Therefore, any harms committed by the intelligent software
agent that breach the licensee's legal duties will cause the licensee to
be liable.
V. CONCLUSION
Current first generation software agents lack any significant
ability to learn from their experiences; this limits their ability to
make decisions. Thus, this current generation of software agents in-
vokes traditional legal responsibility.
Yet technology is already progressing to the next level in soft-
ware, that of artificial intelligence, which will create increasingly
"smarter" software. This next wave of technology will allow soft-
ware agents to gain increasing intelligence, and independence, as this
second generation software takes action.
The second generation of intelligent software agents, with abili-
ties to learn and exhibit autonomous behaviors, will gain the status of
legal agents. Existing agency law can be applied to evaluate forma-
tion of the agency relationship between the software licensee and the
intelligent software agent.
The actions of the software agents could then bind the software
licensee, as the principal, to any or all of the following: contract
commitments with third parties; liability for torts of the agent; and a
duty of care to third parties. A breach of the licensee's new legal du-
ties, then, will make the licensee completely responsible for the ac-
tions of a "mere" software program.
Most businesses (as principals) are well acquainted with the
concept of being responsible for their agent's actions. In a society
where many individuals are unwilling to take full responsibility for
their own actions, are home software users, then, ready to be fully ac-
countable for the actions of their intelligent software?
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